Europe Faces an Unprecedented Shift in Its Security Environment

Political and Technical Challenges: Building Coordination

Politically, the question of engagement decisions—who authorizes the use of force? Under what rules? At what threshold of incursion?—remains unresolved. NATO member states struggle to harmonize their stances: while some advocate for firmness, others fear escalation, worrying that it could provide a pretext for open conflict. “We are not at war, but we are no longer at peace,” summarized German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in September 2025.

From a technical perspective, weaknesses persist across European territory: numerous radars are not adapted to detecting small objects at low altitudes, there is a lack of intermediate interceptors (dedicated helicopters, directed-energy weapons, standardized anti-drone protocols), and there is no comprehensive mapping of critical sites (airports, power plants, major industrial facilities).

External Reference: A July 2025 report by the European Defence Agency emphasized the need to create “national architectures embedded in a common EU standard, with real-time data sharing, low-altitude sensors, and annual joint exercises.”

The Preparedness of Western Countries: Equipment, Doctrine, and War Economy

Faced with the intensifying threat, a crucial question arises: does Europe currently have sufficient and appropriate means to ensure the security of its airspace? How long would it take for different countries to transition to an effective war economy?

1. Current Capabilities: Uneven Equipment

In nearly all European countries, the stock of anti-aircraft munitions (surface-to-air missiles, short-range interception munitions, Patriot and Mamba batteries, portable anti-drone systems) is deemed insufficient to sustain a high-intensity conflict or a saturation campaign by drone swarms.

France: According to the 2024 Parliamentary Defense Report, France has sufficient stockpiles to “manage a medium crisis for a few weeks” but would quickly come under pressure in the event of a massive attack. New-generation radars (GM400, specific anti-drone radars), helicopters, and interception aircraft are limited in number. The ability to rapidly produce effectors or adapt the industry remains below the Ukrainian example.
Germany: After decades of underinvestment, the “Zeitenwende” announced by Chancellor Scholz unlocked €100 billion in 2022 to strengthen the Bundeswehr, but many procurement contracts are still in the engineering or bidding phase. The Luftwaffe remains under-equipped to handle drone saturation and low-altitude surveillance.
Poland and the Baltic States: Politically proactive but heavily reliant on American support and Western equipment deliveries; they have accelerated investments in detection and anti-drone R&D but have very limited production capacity and infrastructure that is difficult to make interoperable in the short term.
Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway, Sweden): High alert levels but lacking intermediate interceptors, with civil-military coordination only being developed since the war in Ukraine. Denmark, in particular, has been criticized for its lack of primary radars adapted to small drones.
United Kingdom: Boasts a more extensive fleet of surveillance aircraft (AWACS) and anti-drone capabilities but focuses its efforts on nuclear deterrence and aid to Ukraine.

According to the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the modernization gap in air defenses amounts to years in some countries (cf. “European Defence Gaps,” ECFR, June 2025).

2. Doctrine and Legal Framework: Latency and Complexity

The shift to a proactive posture is hindered by the lack of harmonized doctrines, the difficulty of triggering a war economy (emergency procurement procedures, industrial mobilization, lifting regulatory barriers), and the absence of a clear “political green light” for retaliation.

Poland’s case is exemplary: to allow the immediate downing of Russian drones or aircraft, the parliament is working to amend military law, but this transition remains challenging at the European level, where each nation retains decision-making sovereignty.

3. Transition Time to a War Economy: Country-by-Country Estimates

France: Despite the announcement of a “war economy” in 2022 by President Emmanuel Macron, industrialists estimate a minimum of 18–24 months to produce defense systems at full capacity (source: Groupement des Industries de Défense et Sécurité, 2024). The supply chain suffers from a shortage of components, specialized labor, and prerequisites for mass production.
Germany: Similarly, a report from the Ministry of Defense (April 2025) acknowledges that it would take “at least two years” to double the production rate of essential munitions due to a lack of strategic stockpiles and European suppliers.
Poland and the Baltic States: Investing in local factories (e.g., the Polish Patriot complex/PGE) but still dependent on American imports (Patriot missiles, HIMARS). Transitioning to a “full war” economy will depend on logistical and political support from Washington.
Italy, Spain: Less exposed, they have only limited stockpiles, and their defense industries are slow to react (cf. observations from the IAI think tank, May 2025).
Scandinavia: Finland and Sweden, while more trained for “total mobilization,” acknowledge they lack the logistics and stockpiles to sustain more than a few months of intense engagement (cf. Swedish FOI Institute, 2025 report).

In summary, for most European countries, transitioning to a fully industrialized war mode would take between 18 months and 3 years due to a lack of prior preparation—a critical delay compared to the rapid execution observed in Russia or Ukraine since 2022.

4. Production and Stockpiles of Armaments: A Shared Achilles’ Heel

The war in Ukraine revealed the West’s difficulty in supporting an ally over the long term: in 2023–2024, Europe struggled to deliver more than 600,000 155mm shells to Kyiv in a year, while Ukraine sometimes consumed 5,000 per day at the height of the fighting (source: European Defence Agency, Ukraine Special Report 2024).

Drones, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-jamming radars are even scarcer, with most manufacturers overwhelmed by orders. Dependence on Chinese electronic components and certain critical materials produced abroad (titanium, rare earths) limits flexibility.

Example: According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, local production of drones and interception systems increased by 500% between 2022 and 2025 but remains constrained as only half of the necessary budgets are available due to slow Western financial transfers.

5. Innovation Capacity and Industrial Cooperation

Faced with these weaknesses, the trend is toward European pooling (joint ammunition procurement funds, projects to revive powder/shell production lines, launch of AI drone innovation “labs”). However, thinking in national silos slows overall efficiency.

Reference: Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, set the goal of a “European Sky Shield” and tripling shell production by 2027—but such milestones remain largely dependent on shared political will and massive funding.

Strategic Impact and Implications for European Security

The repeated drone incursions over strategic sites not only have operational impacts (cost, civilian disruption) but also impose constant stress on European public opinion, accelerating debates on rearmament, industrial sovereignty, and strategic autonomy from the United States.

The evolution of the Ukrainian conflict, the American pivot to Asia (Taiwan), and the resilience of the Russian defense industry make coordinated, transparent, and long-term resilient responses more urgent than ever.

Conclusion: Toward a 21st-Century European Defense

Europe stands at a crossroads. The challenges related to securing its airspace go beyond the “drone war” and require a profound redefinition of doctrines, industrial partnerships, and collective response mechanisms. While European political will seems to have strengthened since 2022, the main challenge is no longer diagnosing the threat but addressing it by uniting efforts, relocating production, filling stock gaps, and drastically shortening industrial transition times.

The Danish, Polish, Ukrainian, and Turkish examples show that innovation, societal mobilization, and clarification of command chains are the only levers to transform vulnerability into effective resilience. Without massive and coordinated mobilization, European airspace will remain exposed to all the hybridizations of modern warfare.