Standfirst. Europe’s proposed KIDS Act is being described as a social-media age law. That description misses its real significance. The proposal would regulate how feeds rank content, how strangers make contact, when notifications arrive, how games reward attention and how AI companions relate to minors. For public-affairs leaders, the decisive arena is no longer only the legislative text. It is the product itself.

Executive Summary

• On September 17, 2026, the European Commission proposed the EU KIDS Act. Children under 13 would be unable to hold social-media accounts; 13- and 14-year-olds could use limited, guardian-managed accounts; independent accounts would begin at 15. The proposal still requires agreement by the European Parliament and Council and may change substantially.
• The proposal reaches beyond access. It would constrain infinite scrolling, engagement-driven recommendations, unsolicited contact, certain reward mechanisms, night-time notifications and emotionally dependent relationships with AI companions. It would also impose duties on app stores, online games and video-sharing services.
• The central policy tension is not “safety versus innovation.” It is how to achieve effective child protection without creating intrusive identity systems, excluding legitimate users or imposing restrictions that fail constitutional proportionality tests.
• Four recent experiences illuminate the challenge. France’s national under-15 restriction was censured on freedom-of-expression and data-safeguard grounds. The United Kingdom has moved from general duties to detailed evidence standards and enforcement. Australia’s under-16 rule shows how a clear political mandate can underperform when the first layer of age detection is weak. The EU proposal attempts to combine age rules, safety by design and privacy-preserving verification.
• Public affairs can no longer operate downstream from product design. The relevant operating model joins policy, engineering, privacy, child safety, legal affairs and communications around five tests: Access, Architecture, Assurance, Accountability and Appeal.

The Headline Is the Age Limit. The Policy Is the Interface.

Age limits are politically legible. A minister can announce one in a sentence; a parent can understand it immediately; a platform can be asked whether it supports or opposes it. Interfaces are harder. Their consequences emerge from thousands of small decisions: what appears first in a feed, whether the next video starts automatically, whether a child can be contacted by someone unknown, whether leaving an app breaks a streak, whether a chatbot remembers a vulnerable conversation.

The European Commission’s proposed KIDS Act, COM(2026) 681, brings those decisions into the domain of public policy. The proposal covers social networks, video-sharing services, some online games, software application stores, AI companions and general conversational chatbots accessible to minors. It combines staged access to social media with mandatory safety-by-design rules and a common framework for age assurance.

The age staircase is straightforward. Under-13s would not hold social-media accounts. Children aged 13 and 14 could receive guardian-managed “mini accounts,” with parental controls and a daily limit of no more than one hour. At 15, young people could establish independent accounts, but the services would still have to be designed for minors’ safety. Existing accounts would have to be reviewed within six months of the rules applying; an account belonging to someone under 15—or whose age could not be established—would be disabled unless it qualified for the supervised route.

The design provisions are more consequential. According to the Commission’s official explanation, services used by minors would face restrictions on infinite scrolling without breaks, engagement-oriented notifications, streaks and mass-audience rewards. Minors’ accounts would be private by default. Recommender systems would have to prioritize safety, quality and mental health rather than engagement; tracking-based personalization would be off by default. Unsolicited contact would be constrained. AI companions could not be designed to foster emotional dependency, and certain memory functions would be disabled by default.

These are not communications obligations. They affect growth metrics, advertising models, interface design, data flows, model behavior, vendor selection and release schedules. They also create a new kind of public-affairs problem: the company’s policy position cannot be separated from the experience delivered by its code.

Why This Is a Public-Affairs Issue

It would be tempting to assign the KIDS Act to legal and compliance teams. That would repeat a familiar mistake. Rules of this kind are shaped by evidence of how products behave, by stories of harm, by parental expectations, by constitutional rights, by technical claims about age assurance and by confidence—or lack of it—in the platforms’ willingness to change their business models.

Public affairs sits at the junction of those forces. It must understand what policymakers are trying to prevent, what engineers can reliably deliver, what privacy authorities will accept, what civil-society groups regard as meaningful protection and what the company can prove rather than merely promise.

The discipline’s contribution is therefore not to soften an unpopular feature or defend an existing model at all costs. It is to help the organization identify which public bargain can survive contact with law, technology and lived experience. In this case, the bargain is demanding: children should gain access gradually; the services they use should not exploit developmental vulnerabilities; adults should not have to surrender unnecessary identity data; mistakes should be correctable; and regulators should be able to test whether the system works.

A company that treats each demand separately will produce contradictions. Stronger age checks can create new privacy risks. More parental control can undermine adolescents’ legitimate autonomy. Safety filters can over-remove lawful information. A universal rule can burden small services while leaving determined users able to circumvent it. The task is to design the whole system, not maximize one objective in isolation.

The Five-A Test: From Political Promise to Workable Protection

A practical way to evaluate online child-safety policy is to ask five questions. Each begins with “A,” but the framework is less a slogan than a sequence. Failure at any stage can defeat the policy as a whole.

1. Access: Who may enter, at what age and under whose authority?

Access rules define the boundary. They may prohibit accounts below a certain age, require parental authorization, distinguish types of services or allow a graduated set of functions. Clear boundaries matter, but age alone is a blunt proxy for maturity and risk. A messaging function, a public livestream and a child-oriented educational video are not equivalent simply because they appear on connected devices.

The EU proposal attempts differentiation. Its strictest account restrictions focus on social-networking and video-sharing services with risky features, while its wider safety-by-design duties extend to games, app stores and conversational AI. For public-affairs teams, this means that debates over scope will be as important as debates over the headline age. The question is not only “15 or 16?” It is which functions and services trigger which obligations.

2. Architecture: What must the service stop, start or redesign?

An age gate does little if the environment behind it remains engineered around compulsive use, invasive contact or uncontrolled recommendations. Architecture concerns default privacy, ranking logic, notifications, autoplay, livestreaming, spending mechanisms, location access and the behavior of AI systems.

This is the KIDS Act’s most important move. It treats safety as a property of the service rather than a warning attached to it. The distinction resembles product-safety regulation in the physical world: responsibility moves upstream, from telling users to be careful toward requiring manufacturers to remove foreseeable hazards where reasonably possible.

The political consequence is substantial. Companies will be judged not only on content-removal statistics, but on whether they knowingly preserve mechanisms that increase exposure, dependency or unwanted contact. Product road maps become evidence in a public-policy debate.

3. Assurance: How is age established without building an identity dragnet?

Self-declared birth dates are easily circumvented. Universal identity checks are intrusive. Facial age estimation, digital identity, payment data, mobile-network signals and behavioral inference each carry different error, bias and privacy profiles.

The Commission proposes certified solutions independent from the platforms, including its age-verification application and, eventually, the European Digital Identity Wallet. The intended model is attribute disclosure rather than identity disclosure: the service would receive a yes-or-no answer about an age threshold, not the user’s name, document or full date of birth. The Commission describes the approach as a form of zero-knowledge proof.

That ambition aligns with the European Data Protection Board’s Statement 1/2025 on age assurance, which places necessity, proportionality and data protection at the center of age-checking systems. But the real test will be implementation. “Privacy preserving” is not a permanent characteristic bestowed by a press release. It must be demonstrated across issuance, device storage, proof presentation, recovery, fraud prevention and vendor governance.

4. Accountability: Who must prove that the system works?

Many regulatory regimes begin with a duty and wait for the authority to demonstrate noncompliance. The KIDS Act would reverse part of that logic for the largest platforms. Providers with at least 45 million monthly active users in the EU would have to submit compliance plans before coming into contact with children under the new regime and support them with independent audits paid for by the providers. The Commission could object where the auditor’s independence was inadequate.

The proposal would use enforcement structures already established by the Digital Services Act and the AI Act. The Commission’s explanatory material states that fines could reach 6 percent of total worldwide annual turnover and describes expedited procedures for the largest supervised services.

For corporate leaders, the implication is that evidence architecture matters as much as product architecture. It is not enough to deploy an age-assurance vendor or activate a safety setting. The organization must know the error rates, circumvention patterns, false-positive consequences, data flows, testing limitations and remediation process. Outsourcing the check does not outsource responsibility.

5. Appeal: What happens when the system is wrong?

Every age-assurance system will make mistakes. A teenager may be classified as an adult; an adult may be excluded; a child without conventional identity documents may be unable to demonstrate eligibility for a supervised service. Appeals are not an administrative afterthought. They are part of accuracy, legitimacy and equal access.

A workable regime therefore requires clear notice, an accessible review route, alternative proof methods, timely correction and special attention to vulnerable users. It also needs a way to contest automated decisions without forcing the person to disclose more information than the original check required.

Public confidence will depend disproportionately on these edge cases. The most visible story may not concern the millions who pass through the system correctly. It may concern the one child excluded from an educational community, the adult wrongly locked out or the vulnerable teenager whose account is closed without a safe way to recover information and contacts.

Case Study One: The EU Tries to Regulate the System, Not Only the User

The KIDS Act is a proposal, not settled law. Parliament and the Council will examine it, stakeholders will contest its definitions and the final obligations may differ materially. Treating the September 17 text as inevitable would be poor analysis and poor public affairs.

Its policy architecture is nevertheless clear. The Commission is trying to solve three problems at once: inconsistent national age limits, harmful product design and weak proof of compliance. The proposal relies on Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the internal-market legal base. The Commission argues that national initiatives ranging from 13 to 16, with different scopes and parental-consent rules, would fragment cross-border digital services and create uneven protection.

The public-health evidence is real but complex. The proposal’s explanatory memorandum states that only half of European children aged 9 to 16 say they feel safe online and lists risks ranging from cyberbullying and grooming to reduced sleep, anxious symptoms and addictive behaviors. Its impact work draws on consultations and surveys, including a 2026 Eurobarometer exercise covering more than 26,000 people aged 13 to 18 and more than 12,000 parents. Those figures establish the scale of concern; they do not prove that every listed harm is caused by every platform or that a single age threshold will resolve it.

The Commission’s stronger case is structural. It argues that services used by minors should be designed around their evolving capacities rather than adapting adult products through warnings. By combining access rules with design duties, the proposal avoids suggesting that a verified birthday transforms a risky architecture into a safe one.

Its unresolved questions are equally important. The legislation will need durable definitions for addictive design, emotional dependency and harmful recommendation patterns. It will need a credible relationship with the DSA, AI Act, GDPR and audiovisual rules. It will need to show that common European age assurance avoids the privacy and exclusion problems of identity-heavy systems. And it will need enforcement capacity beyond the largest platforms.

The public-affairs lesson is that constructive engagement must be granular. General support for child safety contributes little. Policymakers need evidence about which feature creates which risk, which intervention changes the outcome, what data the intervention requires and how its unintended consequences will be corrected.

Case Study Two: France and the Cost of Skipping the Rights Test

France provides the clearest warning against assuming that political popularity resolves legal proportionality. A national law sought to prevent children under 15 from accessing social networks and required age verification. On August 14, 2026, the Conseil constitutionnel censured the central restriction in Decision No. 2026-910 DC.

The court did not deny the legitimacy of protecting minors. It concluded that the mechanism imposed a disproportionate restriction on freedom of expression and communication and lacked sufficient safeguards around the processing of personal data. The result matters beyond France: a compelling objective does not excuse an imprecise or overbroad instrument.

This was a failed approach in institutional terms. The policy had political momentum and a clear age threshold, but it did not survive constitutional review in the form adopted. The failure was not simply legal drafting. It reflected an incomplete policy design: access had been prioritized without adequately resolving assurance, proportionality and rights safeguards.

The EU proposal is partly an answer to this fragmentation. A regulation could create one market-wide framework, and its graduated access model is more differentiated than a simple under-15 prohibition. Yet European legislation is not immune from fundamental-rights scrutiny. The KIDS Act will still have to reconcile child protection, privacy, freedom of expression, access to information and non-discrimination.

For public-affairs practitioners, France demonstrates why constitutional, privacy and youth-rights expertise must enter the conversation before a policy position hardens. A coalition that frames every safeguard as dilution may win the press conference and lose the law.

Case Study Three: The United Kingdom Turns Principles into Evidence

The United Kingdom’s Online Safety Act offers a different lesson: implementation depends on increasingly precise expectations and visible enforcement. Ofcom’s January 2025 guidance defined “highly effective age assurance” through four qualities—technical accuracy, robustness, reliability and fairness—while allowing several possible methods. Self-declaration was not considered sufficient.

By July 2026, Ofcom’s first statutory report on age assurance drew on the first six months after child-protection duties began. The regulator concluded that effective age checks could work when properly implemented, but emphasized that no single method eliminated circumvention. It called for layers of protection across services, app stores, operating systems and devices. It also rejected age inference as an adequate control where a child has to register and use the service long enough for the inference to operate.

On September 23, 2026, that logic moved into a fresh enforcement case. Ofcom opened an investigation into Aylo, the provider of Pornhub, over a process relying on signals from Apple that suggested some users had completed age checks. Ofcom stressed that responsibility remained with the regulated service regardless of where in the chain the check occurred. The authority said it would examine whether the provider had conducted sufficient due diligence and testing. The opening of an investigation is not a finding of breach; Aylo will have an opportunity to respond if Ofcom reaches provisional findings.

The case is highly relevant to every platform preparing for the KIDS Act. It shows that assurance is a supply chain. A service may rely on an app store, operating system, identity provider or specialist vendor, but it must understand how the signal was produced and whether it is effective for the specific legal purpose. “Our partner checked” is not a control framework.

The British approach is not beyond criticism. Age checks create friction and privacy concerns, and enforcement across a vast number of services remains difficult. Its strength lies in translating a broad statutory goal into testable criteria, reporting early evidence and using investigations to clarify where responsibility sits.

Case Study Four: Australia and the Gap Between a Ban and a Working Gate

Australia’s under-16 social-media restriction took effect on December 10, 2025. The law placed the obligation on platforms, not children or parents, and required “reasonable steps” to prevent under-16s from creating or keeping accounts. The eSafety Commissioner’s guidance advocated a layered approach using systems, technology, people, processes and communications. It rejected self-declaration as sufficient, discouraged blanket checks and required alternatives where government identification was offered.

That principles-based model was intended to balance effectiveness, privacy and user friction. Implementation exposed the weakness of a chain whose first link did not reliably trigger. In July 2026, Reuters reported a test conducted by KJR, a firm involved in Australia’s earlier technology trial. Testers opened 50 accounts across nine covered platforms, declared the users to be 16 and were not asked for age proof. The finding was contested in part: Meta said the accounts had declared themselves above the threshold and may not have behaved like genuine under-16 users. The regulator maintained that layered checks could avoid a single point of failure if implemented correctly.

The test did not measure every platform interaction, and dummy accounts cannot perfectly reproduce adolescent behavior. It nevertheless identified a basic governance problem. A sophisticated verification tool has no effect if the service never decides that a user should encounter it. Age inference may reduce friction, but it can become a policy blind spot when a platform needs months of behavior before detecting that an account is probably underage.

Australia’s experience does not prove that age assurance is impossible. Its government-sponsored Age Assurance Technology Trial evaluated multiple approaches and demonstrated that different technical methods exist. The rollout shows something more practical: capability, trigger logic, anti-circumvention testing and enforcement must be designed together.

For the EU, the warning is direct. A common verification application may solve the proof transaction while leaving unanswered when the transaction is required, how existing accounts are identified, how circumvention is detected and how platforms are tested under real behavior rather than idealized user journeys.

Comparison: Four Models, Four Different Tests

Jurisdiction	Core approach	Strongest feature	Documented weakness or unresolved issue	Public-affairs lesson
European Union, proposed 2026	Graduated access plus safety by design, common age assurance and pre-market compliance evidence for the largest platforms	Addresses product architecture as well as age	Definitions, proportionality, technical implementation and legislative outcome remain unsettled	Engage feature by feature and substantiate every claim
France, 2026	National under-15 restriction with age verification	Clear political objective	Central provision censured as disproportionate and insufficiently safeguarded	Fundamental rights must shape the instrument from the beginning
United Kingdom, 2025–2026	Risk duties, detailed guidance, evidence reporting and active enforcement	Converts “effective” into operational criteria and due diligence	Friction, privacy, circumvention and cross-service coverage remain difficult	Responsibility follows the service even when checks are outsourced
Australia, 2025–2026	Under-16 account restriction using reasonable, layered steps	Explicit platform responsibility and technology-neutral guidance	Testing reported weak triggering and continued circumvention	A legal gate fails when the product journey does not reliably activate it

The Public-Affairs Function Must Move Upstream

Corporate public affairs often enters after the product decision. It maps stakeholders, explains the company’s position, prepares executives and manages controversy. That sequence is inadequate when regulation concerns the product’s defaults and decision logic.

The function must move upstream for three reasons.

First, policymakers increasingly ask questions that require product evidence. How many minors receive messages from unknown adults? Which recommendation signals are suppressed for them? What happens to a 14-year-old’s saved content when an account is disabled? How often does an age-estimation model misclassify adults of different demographic groups? Communications teams cannot improvise credible answers after a hearing has been scheduled.

Second, public claims create regulatory risk. A company that announces a “safe-by-design” system will be expected to define safety, publish relevant metrics and explain exceptions. A promise can become an enforcement benchmark, a litigation exhibit or a source of reputational damage when the user journey contradicts it.

Third, the most durable advocacy offers implementable alternatives. Policymakers are less likely to accept a generic warning about privacy if the company cannot show a less intrusive method. They are less likely to credit concern about innovation if the business model depends on features that the evidence associates with compulsive use. Credibility comes from specifying the trade-off and demonstrating a control.

Practical Lessons

Do not lobby the age without lobbying the mechanism

Whether the threshold is 13, 15 or 16 matters, but it is only one design choice. Organizations should analyze service scope, parental authorization, account migration, verification triggers, recommender rules, AI memory, notification limits, independent auditing and appeal rights. A position on the headline number is not a policy strategy.

Treat privacy and safety as joint engineering requirements

A weak debate asks whether society wants child safety or privacy. A serious design asks what minimum fact the service needs, whether it can receive an age attribute without identity, how long the data persists, who can link transactions and what alternative exists when the system fails. The organization should be able to diagram the data flow and defend every field.

Test circumvention before celebrating accuracy

A vendor’s laboratory accuracy says little about whether a child encounters the check, borrows an adult credential, creates another account or shifts to a less regulated service. Testing must cover the entire user journey, including deliberate evasion, repeated attempts and recovery after an erroneous decision.

Build evidence for regulators before building messages for media

Product documentation, risk assessments, audit independence, vendor due diligence and remediation logs will carry more weight than assurances. The communications narrative should emerge from that evidence. Reversing the order creates avoidable credibility gaps.

Include young people without transferring responsibility to them

Children and adolescents understand how platforms are actually used, where controls are circumvented and which restrictions create new risks. Consultation improves design. It does not relieve companies or governments of their duties. “Parental control” and “digital literacy” should complement safe systems, not excuse unsafe ones.

What Leaders Should Do Now

1. Map exposure by function. Identify every service, feature and AI interaction accessible to minors—not merely products marketed to them. Record which KIDS Act duties could apply to each.
2. Create a Five-A evidence file. For Access, Architecture, Assurance, Accountability and Appeal, name the control owner, available evidence, known limitations and open policy question.
3. Bring public affairs into product governance. Establish a standing group linking engineering, child safety, privacy, legal, policy, trust and safety, security and communications. Give it authority to delay claims that the evidence cannot support.
4. Audit the assurance supply chain. Determine how operating systems, app stores, digital-identity issuers and specialist vendors generate age signals. Verify contracts, testing rights, failure handling and responsibility for updates.
5. Run rights-based red teams. Test not only whether a child can bypass the gate, but whether legitimate users are wrongly excluded, whether sensitive data can be linked and whether appeals work for people without conventional documents.
6. Prepare two policy positions. One should address the Commission proposal as written; the other should anticipate plausible parliamentary and Council amendments. Both should identify provisions the organization can implement, provisions needing clarification and better alternatives supported by evidence.
7. Separate verified performance from aspiration. Public materials should distinguish deployed controls, tested results, future commitments and policy preferences. This is especially important while the EU text remains a proposal.

Conclusion: Legitimacy Will Be Coded

The KIDS Act begins with an understandable political demand: children should not have to enter digital spaces designed as if they were adults. Its answer is more ambitious than an age ban. It would reach into the ranking system, the notification engine, the contact settings, the AI relationship and the evidence a platform must produce before claiming safety.

France shows that urgency cannot displace proportionality. The United Kingdom shows that responsibility persists across outsourced systems and must be supported by due diligence. Australia shows that a legal threshold is ineffective if the product never reliably activates the check. The European proposal tries to absorb those lessons by connecting access, design, privacy-preserving assurance and proof.

For senior executives and boards, this is not a niche child-safety file. It concerns business models, product governance, data architecture, constitutional rights and the organization’s license to operate. For public-affairs leaders, it changes the job. The persuasive brief will no longer be enough. The argument will be judged against the interface.

In the next phase of digital regulation, legitimacy will not simply be announced in Brussels, Paris, London or Canberra. It will be coded into what the user can see, what the system can infer and what the company can prove.

Key Evidence

• September 17, 2026: the European Commission proposed the EU KIDS Act as COM(2026) 681; it remains subject to negotiation by Parliament and Council.
• 13 / 15: under the proposal, independent social-media accounts would be prohibited below 15; under-13s would have no social-media accounts, while 13- and 14-year-olds could use guardian-managed limited accounts.
• 45 million: platforms at or above this EU monthly-active-user threshold would face pre-contact compliance plans and independent audit requirements under the proposed framework.
• 6 percent: the proposed maximum fine is 6 percent of worldwide annual turnover, according to the Commission’s official explanation.
• August 14, 2026: France’s Conseil constitutionnel censured the central national under-15 restriction on freedom-of-expression and safeguard grounds.
• 50 test accounts: KJR told Reuters that none of 50 Australian test accounts opened across nine covered platforms and declared as age 16 was asked for proof of age; platforms and the regulator disputed what the limited test demonstrated.

Glossary

Age assurance The general process of establishing or estimating whether a person falls above or below an age threshold. It includes age verification and age estimation. Age verificationA process that confirms age or an age threshold using evidence such as a digital credential, document, payment or trusted data source.Age estimation: A process that predicts an age or range from characteristics or behavior, rather than confirming it through an authoritative credential.Safety by design: Building protective defaults and risk controls into a service’s architecture instead of relying mainly on warnings or user action after harm occurs.Zero-knowledge proof: A cryptographic method that allows one party to prove a fact—such as being above a threshold—without revealing the underlying identity data.Very Large Online Platform (VLOP)A Digital Services Act category for platforms reaching at least 45 million average monthly active recipients in the EU.

References and Further Reading

European Union: Official and Primary Sources

1. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation: EU KIDS Act—EU Keeping Internet Digital Spaces Accountable and Trustworthy, COM(2026) 681 final, September 17, 2026.
2. European Commission, Analysis of Impacts Accompanying the Proposal for the EU KIDS Act, SWD(2026) 681 final, September 17, 2026.
3. European Commission, “The KIDS Act Explained,” updated September 21, 2026.
4. European Data Protection Board, Statement 1/2025 on Age Assurance, February 12, 2025.

France and the United Kingdom

5. Conseil constitutionnel, Decision No. 2026-910 DC, August 14, 2026.
6. Ofcom, “Age Checks to Protect Children Online,” January 16, 2025.
7. Ofcom, Report on the Use of Age Assurance, July 27, 2026.
8. Ofcom, “Ofcom Launches Investigation into Pornhub’s Age Checks,” September 23, 2026.

Australia and Comparative Evidence

9. Australian eSafety Commissioner, “Regulatory Guidance: Social Media Minimum Age,” updated September 17, 2026.
10. Age Assurance Technology Trial, Final Report of the Australian Age Assurance Technology Trial, 2025.
11. Byron Kaye, “Australia’s Teen Social Media Ban Fails to Clear First Hurdle in Age Checks, Says Study,” Reuters, July 7, 2026.
12. Reuters, “How the EU’s Age-Verification App for Children Would Work,” September 18, 2026.
13. Reuters, “What Is in the EU’s Planned KIDS Act?” September 17, 2026.

Source and Methodology Note

Research cutoff: September 24, 2026. This article prioritizes the Commission’s legislative proposal and impact document, the French constitutional decision, regulatory materials from Ofcom and Australia’s eSafety Commissioner, the Australian technology trial and contemporaneous Reuters reporting. The KIDS Act is a proposal and may be amended or rejected; future-tense descriptions refer to the Commission text, not existing obligations. Ofcom’s September 23 investigation is ongoing and is not evidence that Aylo has breached the law. The Australian 50-account test is a limited external study whose interpretation was contested by platforms and the regulator; it is used as evidence of an implementation question, not a definitive measure of system-wide compliance. Claims about organizational implications and public-affairs practice are the author’s analysis.

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